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ABSTRACT
Remote attestation (RA) is a popular means of detecting
malware in embedded and IoT devices. RA is usually re-
alized as an interactive protocol, whereby a trusted party –
verifier – measures integrity of a potentially compromised re-
mote device – prover. Early work focused on purely software-
based and fully hardware-based techniques, neither of which
is ideal for low-end devices. More recent results have yielded
hybrid (SW/HW) security architectures comprised of a min-
imal set of features to support efficient and secure RA on
low-end devices.
All prior RA techniques require on-demand operation, i.e,
RA is performed in real time. We identify some drawbacks
of this general approach in the context of unattended de-
vices: First, it fails to detect mobile malware that enters and
leaves the prover between successive RA instances. Second,
it requires the prover to engage in a potentially expensive
(in terms of time and energy) computation, which can be
harmful for critical or real-time devices.
To address these drawbacks, we introduce the concept of
self-measurement where a prover device periodically (and se-
curely) measures and records its own software state, based
on a pre-established schedule. A possibly untrusted veri-
fier occasionally collects and verifies these measurements.
We present the design of a concrete technique called ERAS-
MUS: Efficient Remote Attestation via Self-Measurement
for Unattended Settings, justify its features and evaluate
its performance. In the process, we also define a new metric
– Quality of Attestation (QoA). We argue that ERASMUS
is well-suited for time-sensitive and/or safety-critical appli-
cations that are not served well by on-demand RA. Finally,
we show that ERASMUS is a promising stepping stone to-
wards handling attestation of multiple devices (i.e., a group
or swarm) with high mobility.
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, embedded and cyber-physical systems (CPS),
under the guise of Internet-of-Things (IoT), have entered
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many aspects of daily life, such as: homes, office build-
ings, public venues, factories and vehicles. This trend of
adding computerized components to previously analog de-
vices and then inter-connecting them brings many obvious
benefits. However, it also greatly expands the so-called “at-
tack surface” and turns these newly computerized gadgets
into natural and attractive attack targets. In particular, as
recent incidents demonstrated, IoT devices can be infected
with malware and used as bot-controlled zombies in Dis-
tributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. Also, IoT-borne
malware can snoop on device owners (by sensing) or mali-
ciously control critical services (by actuation), as happened
with Stuxnet [26].
One key component in securing IoT devices is malware
detection, which is typically attained with Remote Attesta-
tion (RA). RA is a distinct security service that allows a
trusted party, called verifier, to securely verify the internal
state (including memory and storage) of a remote untrusted
and potentially malware-infected device, called prover. RA
is realized via an interactive protocol between prover and
verifier. A typical example is described in [5]: (1) verifier
sends an attestation request to prover, (2) prover verifies the
request1 and (3) computes a cryptographic function of its in-
ternal state, then (4) sends the result to verifier, and finally,
(5) verifier checks the result and decides whether prover is
infected.
This general approach is referred to as on-demand attesta-
tion and all current RA techniques adhere to it. In this pa-
per, we identify two important limitations of this approach.
First, it is a poor match for unattended devices, since mal-
ware that “comes and goes” (i.e., mobile malware [16]) can
not be detected if it leaves prover by the time attestation
is performed. Second, for a device working under time con-
straints (real-time operation) or otherwise providing critical
services, on-demand attestation requires performing a pos-
sibly time-consuming task while deviating from the device’s
main function(s).
To address these issues, we design ERASMUS: Efficient
Remote Attestation via Self-Measurement for Unattended
Settings. ERASMUS is based on self-measurements. Basi-
cally, a device (prover) measures and records its state at
scheduled times. Measurements are stored in prover’s in-
secure memory. Verifier occasionally collects and validates
these measurements in order to establish the history of prover’s
state. Notably, with this general approach, verifier imposes
only negligible real-time burden on prover. It also offers
1Since attestation is a potentially expensive task, this veri-
fication mitigates computational DoS attacks.
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strictly better quality-of-service than prior attestation tech-
niques, because verifier obtains prover’s entire history of
measurements, since the last verifier request. In other words,
ERASMUS de-couples (1) frequency of prover checking, from
(2) frequency of prover measurements, which are equivalent
in on-demand attestation. Finally, ERASMUS simplifies RA
design (in terms of required features) for prover: authenti-
cation of verifier requests is no longer needed, since compu-
tational DoS attacks do not arise.2
We also introduce the new notion of Quality of Attestation
(QoA) which captures: (1) how a device (prover) is attested,
(2) how often its state is measured, and (3) how often these
measurements are verified. It is the temporal analogue of the
concept of quality of swarm attestation (QoSA) introduced
in [6] in the context of attesting groups of devices.
NOTE: ERASMUS is not intended as a replacement for on-
demand attestation, mainly because for some devices and
some settings, real-time on-demand attestation is manda-
tory, e.g., immediately before or after a software update or
for secure erasure/reset. Also, on-demand attestation may
be more flexible, e.g., if the verifier is only interested in mea-
suring a fraction of prover’s memory. These two approaches
are not mutually exclusive and may be used together to in-
crease QoA, specifically, in terms of freshness of the latest
measurement.
The last incentive for our self-measurement approach is
its suitability for highly mobile groups of devices. RA pro-
tocols developed for “swarm attestation”, e.g., [2, 18, 11, 6],
are designed to efficiently attest groups of interconnected
devices on-demand, with a single verifier-prover interaction.
However, they do not work in highly mobile swarms, since
on-demand attestation requires topology to remain essen-
tially static during the entire attestation protocol instance
– the time for which is dominated by computation on all
swarm devices. Since ERASMUS involves virtually no real
time computation for prover, it is much more suitable for
high-mobility swarm settings.
After overviewing the state-of-the-art in Section 2, we in-
troduce ERASMUS and QoA in Section 3. An implementa-
tion and experimental results are discussed in Sect 4. Issues
arising in time-sensitive applications and partial mitigation
measures are discussed in Section 5. Applicability of ERAS-
MUS to swarm attestation is considered in Section 6.
2. REMOTE ATTESTATION (RA)
RA aims to detect malware presence by verifying integrity
of a remote and untrusted embedded (or IoT) device. As
mentioned earlier, it is typically realized as a protocol where
trusted verifier interacts with a remote prover to obtain an
integrity measurement of the latter’s state.
RA techniques fall into the three main categories. (1)
Hardware-based attestation [24, 19] uses dedicated hardware
features such as a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to exe-
cute attestation code in a secure environment. Even though
such features are currently available in personal computers
and smartphones, they are considered a relative “luxury” for
very low-end embedded devices. (2) Software-based attesta-
tion [21, 20] requires no hardware support and performs at-
testation solely based on precise timing measures. However,
it limits prover to being one-hop away from verifier, so that
2This is unlike requirements in [5] that stipulate (potentially
expensive) prover auhentication of verifier’s requests.
round-trip time is either negligible or fixed. It also relies on
strong assumptions about attacker behavior [1] and is typi-
cally only used for legacy devices where no other RA tech-
niques are viable. (3) Finally, hybrid attestation [9, 13, 4],
based on a software/hardware co-design, provides RA while
minimizing its impact on underlying hardware features.
SMART [9] is the first hybrid RA design with minimal hard-
ware modifications to existing microcontroller units (MCUs). It
has the following key features:
• Attestation code is immutable: located in and executed
from ROM.
• Attestation code is safe: its execution always terminates
and leaks no information other than the attestation result
(token).
• Attestation is atomic: (1) it is uninterruptible, and (2) it
starts from the first instruction and exits at the last in-
struction. This is realized in SMART by using hard-wired
MCU access controls and disabling interrupts upon entering
attestation code.
• A secret key (K) is stored in a secure memory location
where it can be accessed only from within the attestation
code: K is stored in ROM and is guarded by specialized
MCU rules.
[5] extended SMART to defend against denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks that try to impersonate verifier. We refers to this ex-
tended design as SMART+. [5] additionally requires prover to
have a Reliable Read-Only Clock (RROC), which is needed to
perform verifier authentication and prevent replay, reorder and
delay attacks. To ensure reliability, RROC must not be modifi-
able by software. Upon receiving a verifier request, ROM-resident
attestation code checks the request’s freshness using RROC, au-
thenticates it, and only then proceeds to perform attestation.
The TrustLite [13] security architecture also supports RA for
low-end devices. It differs from SMART in two ways: (1) inter-
rupts are allowed and handled securely by the CPU Exception
Engine, and (2) access control rules can be programmed using
an Execution-Aware Memory Protection Unit (EA-MPU). Ty-
TAN [4] adopts a similar approach while providing additional
real-time guarantees and dynamic configuration for safety- and
security-critical applications.
HYDRA [8] is a hybrid RA design for medium-end devices de-
vices with a Memory Management Unit (MMU). It builds upon
a formally verified micro-kernel, seL4 [12], to ensure memory iso-
lation and enforce access control to memory regions. Using these
formally and mathematically proven features, access control rules
can be implemented in software and enforced by seL4. Conse-
quently, HYDRA stores K and attestation code in writable mem-
ory regions (e.g., flash or RAM) and configures the system such
that no other process, besides the attestation process, can access
those memory regions. Access control configuration in HYDRA
also involves the attestation process having exclusive access to its
thread control block as well as to memory regions used for K-
related computations. The latter ensures the K protection prop-
erty. To ensure atomic execution, HYDRA runs the attestation
process as the initial user-space process with the highest schedul-
ing priority, while the rest of user-land processes are spawned by
the attestation process, with lower priorities. Finally, hardware-
enforced secure boot is used to provide integrity of seL4 and the
attestation process at system initialization time.
In this paper, we use SMART+ and HYDRA as the base se-
curity architecture for ERASMUS. However, ERASMUS should
be equaly applicable to other on-demand RA techniques, such as
TrustLite[13] or TyTan[4].
3. SELF-MEASUREMENTS
As discussed in Section 1, all current RA techniques perform
on-demand attestation, whereby prover computes verifier-requested
measurements in real-time. This can be a time-consuming activ-
ity that takes prover away from its primary mission. However,
prover performs no RA-related computation between verifier’s re-
quests.
In contrast, ERASMUS divides RA into two phases. In the
measurement phase, prover performs self-measurements based on
a pre-established schedule and stores the results. In the collection
phase, verifier (whenever it chooses to do so) contacts prover to
fetch these measurements. The collection phase is very fast since
it requires practically no computation by prover. In particular,
since measurements are based on a MAC computed with a key
shared between prover and verifier, no extra protection is needed
when prover sends these measurements to verifier. Furthermore,
unlike in on-demand RA, there is no threat of computational DoS
on prover. Thus, there is no need to authenticate verifier’s re-
quests, in contrast with on-demand attestation.
A prover’s measurement Mt computed at time t is defined as:
Mt =< t,H(memt),MACK(t,H(memt)) >
where H is a suitable cryptographic hash function and memt rep-
resents prover’s memory at time t. The computation of H(memt)
and MAC is done in the context of the security architecture, e.g.,
SMART or HYDRA.
From here on, Vrf and Prv are used to denote verifier and
prover, respectively. Although ERASMUS assumes a symmetric
key K shared between Vrf and Prv, a public key signature scheme
could be used instead, with no real impact on security of the
scheme except for higher cost of measurements.
3.1 Quality of Attestation
Quality of Attestation (QoA) is primarily determined by two
parameters: (1) time TM between two successive measurements
on Prv, and (2) time TC between two successive requests by Vrf
to collect measurements from Prv.
We assume that in most cases TC > TM . If it so happens that
TC ≤ TM , verifier will simply collect the same measurements
more than once, which is redundant. Instead, Vrf can explicitly
request Prv to perform a measurement before the collection.
In that case, Vrf’s request would have to be authenticated and
checked for freshness (as in SMART+ [5]) before the on-demand
measurement is computed. These activities clearly incur addi-
tional real-time overhead and delays. We refer to this variant as
ERASMUS+OD.
Exactly how TC and TM are determined clearly depends on
specifics of Prv’s mission and its deployment setting. Security im-
pact of these parameters is intuitive. Smaller TM implies smaller
window of opportunity for mobile malware to escape detection.
Smaller TC implies faster malware detection. If either value is
large, attestation becomes ineffective. Meanwhile, though low
values increase QoA, they also increase Prv’s overall burden, in
terms of computation, power consumption and communication.
Without loss of generality, we assume that measurements and
collections occur at regular intervals. Of course, in practice this
might not work in scenarios that involve critical or time-sensitive
applications (see Section 5). In fact, it might be advantageous
to take measurements at irregular intervals, as doing so might
give prover a bit of an extra edge against mobile malware (see
Section 3.5).
Another ERASMUS parameter is the number of measurements
(referred to as k) obtained by Vrf in each collection phase. It can
range between one (only the most recent measurement) and all.
In a typical setting, Prv’s history size should be set such that each
measurement is collected exactly once. That is, k = dTC/TM e.
Finally, the collection phase involves the notion of freshness,
i.e., how recent is Prv’s latest measurement. Depending on the
application, maximal freshness might be required, e.g., right be-
fore or after a software update. Maximal freshness is attainable
via on-demand attestation In ERASMUS, freshness of a measure-
ment (denoted as f) ranges between TM and 0, which correspond
to minimal and maximal freshness, respectively. On average, we
expect f = TM/2.
Figure 1 shows an example with two malware infections. In
the first, malware covers its tracks and leaves before any mea-
surement takes place. In the second, malware persists on Prv.
Although measurement occurs perhaps soon after infection, cor-
rective action can be taken only after collection, thus illustrating
the importance of a small TC . Measurements and collections are
shown as punctual events in Figure 1. Although they do take
. . . . . .
time
measurement
collection
TM
TCf
infection 1 (undetected)
infection 2 (detected)
Figure 1: QoA illustration: Infection 1 by mobile
malware is undetected; Infection 2 is detected. TM is
the time between two measurements, TC is the time
between two collections, and f is the freshness of
each measurement.
some time to complete (measurements, in particular), it is con-
sidered negligible even for low-end devices (see Section 4).
3.2 Measurements Storage & Collection
A na¨ıve way for Prv to store measurements is to keep track
of them indefinitely. However, this will eventually consume a lot
of Prv’s storage. To this end, ERASMUS uses rolling measure-
ments. A fixed section of Prv’s insecure storage is allocated as
a windowed (circular) buffer for n measurements. The i-th mea-
surement is stored at location Li mod n. However, it is expected
that Vrf collects measurements sufficiently often, such that no
measurement is over-written. That is, the time between succes-
sive collections should be at most TC ≤ n · TM .
The interaction between Prv and Vrf is very simple: Vrf asks
for k latest measurements, which Prv simply reads from the buffer
and transmits. The collection phase does not involve any change
of state on Prv and sent measurements are not encrypted. (Though
recall that they are authenticated, since each measurement is
computed using K). It also does not trigger any significant com-
putation on Prv, i.e., in contrast with on-demand attestation,
no cryptographic operations are required in the collection phase.
However, this is not the case in the ERASMUS+OD variant men-
tioned in Section 3.1, where (1) Vrf’s request must be authenti-
cated and checked for freshness, and (2) a current measurement
must be computed.
Self-measurements can be stored in Prv’s unprotected storage.
This allows malware (that is possibly present on Prv) to tamper
with measurements, by modifying, re-ordering and/or deleting
them. However, since malware (by design of SMART) cannot
access K, it cannot forge measurements. Thus, it is easy to see
that any tampering will be detected by Vrf at the next collection
phase and malware presence would be immediately be noticed.
For the same reasons, code that handles request parsing as well
as storage and transmission of measurements does not need to be
executed in a secure environment or stored in ROM. Code that
performs self-measurement, however, must be protected by the
underlying security architecture, as in on-demand attestation.
Scheduling in ERASMUS can be implemented in a very simple
and stateless manner. Let t be the value of RROC at the time of
measurement Mt, and let TM be the time between two successive
measurements, as configured in Prv. The windowed buffer slot
Li, used to store Mt, is determined by: i = bt/TM c mod n.
ERASMUS collection protocol is shown in Figure 2. No oper-
ation involves the underlying architecture during collection; only
during measurements. Notation ∗Lj refers to contents of location
Lj . A sample memory layout is shown in Figure 3.
3.3 ERASMUS+OD: ERASMUS with On-demandAt-
testation
As mentioned in Section 3.1, ERASMUS may be combined
Vrf Prv
collect k
if k > n :
k = n
M = {∗L(i−j) mod n | 0 ≤ j < k}
foreach Mt ∈M :
check t and h
verify MACK(t, h)
Figure 2: ERASMUS collection protocol.
(i− k) mod n i
t = 1492453673
H(memt) = 0xe4b...ce
MACK(t,H(memt)) = 0xea0...77
Figure 3: ERASMUS memory allocation. Example
with n = 12, i = 3, k = 7.
Vrf Prv
treq, k,MACK(treq)
check treq is fresh
verify MACK(treq)
if not OK:
abort
h = H(memt)
M0 = t, h,MACK(t, h)
if k > n :
k = n
M0,M = {∗L(i−j) mod n | 0 ≤ j < k}
verify M0
foreach Mt ∈M :
check t and h
verify MACK(t, h)
Figure 4: ERASMUS+OD protocol.
with on-demand attestation to benefit from advantages of both
approaches. This variant, ERASMUS+OD, records Prv’s state
history to detect mobile malware, and uses on-demand attesta-
tion to obtain better freshness. Freshness is particularly relevant
whenever real-time attestation is mandatory, e.g., immediately
before or after a software update.
The measurement phase is not modified, while the collection
phase is combined with on-demand attestation request as fol-
lows. First, as part of each attestation request Vrf now com-
putes and includes an authentication token and specifies k. As
in SMART+ [5], authentication of Vrf protects Prv against com-
putational DoS. Then, only after checking that a request is valid,
Prv computes a measurement. Finally, this real-time measure-
ment is sent to Vrf, along with k previous measurements. This
protocol is shown in Figure 4.
This anti-DoS protection incurs an additional cost for Prv which
may interfere with its normal function. A major advantage of
ERASMUS over ERASMUS+OD and regular on-demand attes-
tation is that no such protection is required.
3.4 Security Considerations
Security of the measurement process itself is based on the un-
derlying security architecture, e.g., SMART+ or HYDRA, which:
(1) provides measurements code with exclusive access to K, (2)
ensures non-malleability and non-interruptibility of the measure-
ment code, and (3) performs memory-cleanup after execution.
The timestamps used in the measurement process must be
based on the RROC which (by definition) can not be modified
by non-physical means. This is important since malware should
not influence when measurements are taken.
If RROC value could be modified, the following attack scenario
would become possible: malware enters at time t0 and remains
active long enough so that a measurement at time t0+δ (with δ <
TM ) is taken. Before leaving, malware discards that measurement
and resets the counter to t0. Soon after δ (so that a measurement,
valid this time, has been taken for t0 + δ), malware returns and
resets the counter to time elapsed since t0. Though this example
works for one TM window, it can be extended to arbitrarily many.
It requires an additional assumption that no collection took place
during the presence of malware.
Fortunately, RROC is already a requirement of the underlying
SMART+ security architecture, for a totally different reason. In
SMART+, RROC helps prevent replay and computational DoS
attacks on Prv. Thus, ERASMUS does not require any changes
RAM/
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Hardware-Enforced Read-Only
Figure 5: Memory organization and access rules of
SMART+-based RA. r denotes exclusive read-only ac-
cess.
Table 1: Size of Attestation Executable
MAC Impl. SMART+ HYDRA
On-Demand ERASMUS On-Demand ERASMUS
HMAC-SHA1 4.9KB 4.7KB - -
HMAC-SHA256 5.1KB 4.9KB 231.96KB 233.84KB
Keyed BLAKE2S 28.9KB 28.7KB 239.29KB 241.17KB
to the underlying security architecture.
As mentioned earlier, measurements need not be stored in pro-
tected memory because tampering with them is detectable and
indicates malware presence on Prv. Likewise, the code to sup-
port the collection phase does not require any protection since
measurements are not secret (they are unique for every device
and every timestamp value), and their absence or alteration is
self-incriminating.
3.5 Irregular Intervals
A natural extension to ERASMUS is to use irregular measure-
ments intervals instead of a fixed TM . The motivation is that
mobile malware that is aware of fixed scheduling knows when to
enter/leave the device in order to stay undetected.
One way to implement irregular intervals is to use a Crypto-
graphically Secure Pseudo Random Number Generator (CSPRNG)
iniatialized (seeded) with the secret keyK. Output of the CSPRNG
can be truncated such that TM is upper- and/or lower-bounded.
For example, after computing Mti , Prv can set the measure-
ment timer to:
TnextM = map(CSPRNGk(ti)),
where map is a function that maps CSPRNG output to seconds,
e.g. map : x 7→ x mod (U − L) + L, with U and L upper and
lower bounds, respectively.
The timer itself must be read-protected to ensure that TnextM is
unknown to malware potentially present on Prv. CSPRNG code
must be protected in the same way as the measurement collection.
4. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented ERASMUS on two security architectures: SMART+
and HYDRA. The main difference between them is that the for-
mer targets low-end devices, and the latter – medium-end devices
with a memory management unit (MMU).
4.1 Implementation on SMART+
Figure 5 shows the implementation of ERASMUS atop the
SMART+ architecture. As in SMART+, measurement code and
K reside in ROM. However, the code is invoked periodically
and autonomously, whenever a scheduled timer interrupt occurs.
We now examine ROM size, hardware costs and run-time on
SMART+ architecture.
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ROM Size greatly depends on the choice of MAC algorithms.
We implement ROM-resident code in ”C” using three MAC func-
tions: HMAC-SHA1 [7]3, HMAC-SHA256 [22] and keyed BLAKE2S [17].
We then use open-source MSP430-gcc compiler [25] to compile the
”C” code into an MSP430 executable. Table 1 shows the ROM
size for each SMART+-based approach. As expected, ERASMUS
requires slightly less ROM than on-demand attestation.
Hardware Cost: We implement the hardware part of ERAS-
MUS by modifying the MSP430 architecture, using open-source
OpenMSP430 core [10]. We modify the memory backbone mod-
ule in the OpenMSP430 core to support atomic execution of ROM
code and exclusive access to K. RROC is realized as a periph-
eral using a 64-bit register incremented for every clock cycle. To
ensure write-protection, a write-enable wire is removed in the
RROC module. For timer components, we use the unmodified
version of omsp timerA module provided by OpenMSP430. Note
that hardware timers are not considered to represent additional
hardware cost. This is because they are common and crucial
components of embedded systems. Indeed, it is unusual to find
an embedded device not equipped with at least one timer. Fi-
nally, we use Xilinx ISE 14.7 [27] to synthesize our modifications
of the MSP430 core from a hardware description language to a
combination of registers and look-up tables that serve as building
blocks in FPGA.
As expected, our synthesized results show that ERASMUS uti-
lizes the same amount of registers and look-up tables as the on-
demand attestation. Compared to the unmodified MSP430 core,
ERASMUS requires roughly 13% (655 vs. 579) and 14% (1, 969
vs. 1, 731) additional registers and look-up tables respectively.
Measurement Run-Time: Figure 6 illustrates run-time of the
measurement phase for various memory sizes. Not surprisingly, it
is linearly dependent on memory size and roughly equivalent to
that of on-demand attestation.
4.2 Implementation on HYDRA
Figure 7 illustrates implementations of HYDRA-based ERAS-
MUS and on-demand attestation. We implement these two tech-
niques on an I.MX6 Sabre Lite [3] development board. RROC is
implemented based on the software clock approach, suggested by
Brasser et al. [5]. Specifically, we use a short-term counter from
Sabre Lite’s General Purpose Timer (GPT) and our clock code
in PrAtt to construct RROC. When the counter wraps around
and causes an interrupt, our clock code handles it by updating
higher-order bits of the clock in PrAtt. Then, the clock value is
constructed by combining these bits with the GPT counter. To
ensure read-only property, PrAtt is given exclusive write-access to
RROC components. Also, we utilize Sabre Lite’s Enhanced Peri-
odic Interrupt Timer (EPIT) to schedule execution of ERASMUS
measurement code
We base the code of PrAtt on open-source seL4 libraries [14]:
3Note that HMAC-SHA1 is used for comparison purposes
only. We exclude it in our actual implementations due to a
recent collision attack in SHA1 [23].
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Figure 7: Memory organization of HYDRA-based on-
demand attestation and ERASMUS.
Table 2: Run-Time (in ms) of Collection Phase on
I.MX6-Sabre Lite
Operations ERASMUS ERASMUS+OD
Verify Request N/A 0.005
Compute Measurement4 N/A 285.6
Construct UDP Packet 0.003 0.003
Send UDP Packet 0.012 0.012
Total Collection Run-time 0.015 285.6
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Figure 8: Measurement Run-Time on I.MX6 Sabre
Lite @ 1GHz
seL4utils, seL4vka, seL4vspace, and seL4bench. The first three
provide abstractions of: process, memory management and vir-
tual space, respectively, while the last one is used to evaluate
performance. Finally, we use [15] to implement th network stack:
an Ethernet driver and timer drivers in seL4.
Executable Size: Table 1 compares executable sizes of PrAtt in
on-demand attestation and ERASMUS. Results show that ERAS-
MUS is only about 1% higher in terms of the executable size. This
overhead mostly comes from the need for an additional timer
driver.
Measurement Run-time: Measurement run-time of HYDRA-
based ERASMUS in Figure 4.2 follows the same trend as SMART+-
based ERASMUS: (1) it is linear as a function of memory sizes,
and (2) it is roughly equal to that of on-demand attestation.
Collection Run-time: Table 4.2 shows the run-time breakdown
of the collection phase for each variant. Clearly, in ERASMUS,
run-time of the collection phase is negligible (by at least a factor
of 3, 000), compared to that of the measurement phase. Collection
run-time in ERASMUS+OD, on the other hand, is dominated by
run-time of performing on-demand attestation.
4On 10MB memory using keyed BLAKE2S as the underly-
ing MAC function.
5. AVAILABILITY INTIME-SENSITIVEAP-
PLICATIONS
In some cases, it might be undesirable to interrupt execution
of the Prv’s application process in order to obtain a measure-
ment. This is particularly the case for time-sensitive or safety-
critical applications. As discussed in Section 4, measurements
can take non-negligible time, e.g., 7 seconds on an 8-MHz device
with 10KB RAM. Making Prv unavailable for that long is not
appropriate.
As is, pure on-demand attestation is poorly suited for such
applications. At the same time, if Prv follows a strict schedule,
ERASMUS is also not a remedy since it suffers from the same
issue. However, it can be made more flexible.
One partial measure is for Prv to be self-aware of when time-
sensitive tasks occur. That way, it can schedule measurements at
appropriate times. If this knowledge is also available to Vrf, on-
demand attestation could be used if Vrf adapts to Prv’s schedule.
Another approach is to allow Prv to abort the measurement
in progress, if the need arises. However, this has some caveats:
First, the security architecture needs to be adapted to allow inter-
rupts during measurements. Protection of keys (and cleanup in
case of an interrupt) is still required; thus, there is still a need for
some hardware support. Second, it would be trivial for malware
to abort computation of measurements in order to avoid detec-
tion, or simply pretend, when queried by Vrf, that all attempted
measurements have been aborted. Therefore, Vrf must use some
external information or policy to decide whether there is a valid
justification for each aborted measurement.
To handle such situations, we consider another ERASMUS
variant that involves lenient scheduling. Instead of performing
a measurement every TM , Prv has a window of w × TM where
w ≥ 1. Under normal conditions, Prv behaves as usual, using the
TM window. If something causes a measurement to be aborted,
it can be rescheduled to the end of the current window.
These are certainly not ideal measures, the underlying problem
seems quite difficult to address deterministically. As is typical
for security/usability compromises, real deployment would likely
involve policy-based decisions.
6. SWARM ATTESTATION
Some applications require attesting a group (or swarm) of in-
terconnected embedded devices. In such a setting, it is benefi-
cial to take advantage of interconnectivity and perform collective
attestation using a dedicated protocol. Several swarm attesta-
tion techniques have been proposed. SEDA [2] is the first such
scheme, which relies on hybrid attestation security architectures:
SMART [9] and TrustLite [13]. SEDA combines them with a
request-flooding and response-gathering protocol. SEDA was im-
proved and further specified in LISA [6]. Other related techniques
deal with report aggregation [18] or physical attacks [11].
A concept of Quality of Swarm Attestation (QoSA) was intro-
duced in [6] to capture the level of information that Vrf obtains as
a result of swarm attestation. This can range from binary (“is the
whole swarm healthy?”) to full (state of each individual device
and topology information). QoA, as introduced in this paper, is
an orthogonal measure that captures the state of a given device
in time. QoA and QoSA can be used in concert with one another.
ERASMUS could be used instead of on-demand attestation
in the context of swarm RA protocols. In particular, Prv self-
measurements can be coupled with a collection protocol, such as
LISA-α, where the latter only relays reports and does not per-
form any computation. This would yield a clean and conceptu-
ally simple approach to swarm attestation, with all the benefits
of ERASMUS.
An additional advantage of using ERASMUS in the swarm set-
ting is support for high mobility. Prior swarm RA techniques,
such as SEDA, SANA and LISA require swarm topology to re-
main almost static during the whole swarm attestation instance.
This process may be long and prohibitive for applications where
connectivity changes often. ERASMUS does not require external
input and its collection phase is very fast, since it does not involve
any computation; only reading and sending stored measurements.
This makes ERASMUS a very natural and viable technique for
highly-mobile swarms.
Finally, related to the discussion in Section 5, we consider the
scenario where availability of at least one in (or a part of) a group
of devices is required at all times. This cannot be guaranteed by
on-demand swarm attestation, where a large part of the network
may be concurrently busy. Meanwhile, with ERASMUS, it is
trivial to establish a schedule which ensures that only a fraction
of the swarm computes measurements at any given time.
7. CONCLUSION
We designed ERASMUS as an alternative to current methods
that perform on-demand RA for low-end devices. ERASMUS pro-
vides better QoA in that it allows Vrf to detect mobile malware,
which is not possible with on-demand techniques that only detect
malware if it is currently on Prv. ERASMUS makes it harder for
malware to avoid detection. ERASMUS’s other major advan-
tage is that it requires no cryptographic computation by Prv as
part of its interaction with Vrf. This is particularly relevant in
time-sensitive and critical applications, where Prv’s availability is
very important. We discuss partial mitigation measures for this
problem.
We present the new notion of Quality-of-Attestation (QoA) as
a measure of temporal security guarantees given by an attestation
technique. We show that timing of measurements and timing of
verifications (that are conjoined in on-demand attestation) are
two distinct aspects of QoA. They are treated as distinct param-
eters in ERASMUS. We also discuss that the possibility of using
on-demand attestation as part of ERASMUS collection phase to
obtain maximal freshness.
We implemented ERASMUS on two hybrid RA architectures,
SMART+ and HYDRA, and demonstrated its viability on both.
ERASMUS does not require extra features or a larger ROM than
what is needed in SMART+, and each measurement is fast than
on-demand attestation since no authentication of Vrf requests is
needed. Finally, we show that ERASMUS is a promising option
for highly-mobile groups/swarms of devices, for which no current
RA technique works well.
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